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1. OVERVIEW
Knowledge-based firms are growing exponentially (Romer, 1998) and the demand
for knowledge based products and services is growing in the global economy (King
& Ranft, 2001). Sveiby (1997) points out that even traditional sectors are gradually
including knowledge components in their products and services, which ultimately
enhance the value of the firm. The breaking down of geographic barriers, decreasing
transaction costs, and more freely available capital in the intangible economy are
affecting the entire world. These phenomena have made intellectual capital (IC)
more valuable, thus allowing knowledge-based firms to earn even higher profits
(Daley, 2001). A substantial part of the IC and IC reporting (ICR) literature argues
that the measuring and reporting of IC is primarily a means of enhancing the market
value of firms. Yet research addressing the implications of the actual process and
outcome of ICR has been sparse. In particular, few researchers have addressed the
way in which the processes and outcomes of ICR have been constructed to present
the desired financial position of a firm. This paper seeks not only to fill this gap, but
also to go further by critically analysing the cconstruction of IC and ICR from the
perspective of commodification, in particular the commodification of labour. It
argues that the measuring of IC and ICR is directed towards maximising the market
value of firms.

Cleaver (1979, p. 72) states that the overwhelming majority of people are forced to
sell their lives as commodity labour-power to survive and gain access to wealth in
society. Capitalist production creates and maintains this coercive situation by
achieving total control over all the means of producing wealth in the society. The
notion of commodification in relation to financial management is complex. Shaumai
(1997) explains that commodification is the movement of economic logic that
3

attempts to deal with contradictions within capitalist production, but which instead
produces new contradictions. In relation to IC and ICR, commodification is about
the economic logic of maximising the market value of a firm while dealing with the
contradiction of use of labour for production by the firm. This is arguably achieved
by measurement and reporting techniques of IC that shift human capital represented
by labour into systems and processes over which the firm has greater control, and
supporting the concept of expensing labour rather than treating it as an asset under
the traditional accounting system.

This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 examines commodification in relation
to techniques in accounting, with particular reference to outsourcing of information
technology (IT) services, and activity-based costing. Section 3 reviews how the most
commonly used definitions of IC have assisted the process of commodification. This
section also examines ICR frameworks to highlight how these frameworks have
benefited the interests of capital providers in an unregulated ICR environment.
Further, it reviews indices used for ICR to demonstrate how they are also used to
manipulate reporting in a way that maximises the market value of a firm. Section 4
highlights how the financial reporting framework has influenced the interests of
capital providers in an unregulated ICR environment. The final section offers
concluding remarks relating to how firms choose frameworks which will justify
maximising market value resulting in the cconstruction of data in ICR that hides the
reality of the commodification of labour.

2. COMMODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING TECHNIQUES
The increasing adoption of techniques and practices that replace labour in a firm as a
means of maximising the firm’s market value is essentially an attempt to
substantiate to stakeholders that the firm has adopted efficient and effective
4

techniques and practices. In reality, however, their outcome is to shift the
contradictions associated with long-standing practices of labour (such as
absenteeism and wage negotiations) to a new set of contradictions associated with
the newly adopted techniques and practices.

For instance, in analysing IT outsourcing practices, Yakhlef (2002) points out that
managers, hoping to eliminate the contradictions of in-house IT-related labour,
found themselves instead increasingly entangled in bureaucratic processes dedicated
to documenting IT matters, entrapped in assessing the financial cost of IT requests,
and being made responsible for the outcomes of IT use. Yakhlef points out that
getting rid of in-house IT-related labour in firms has required managers to shift their
focus to a different set of contradictions, namely, the daily monitoring of IT-related
documentation and outcomes. Further, Yakhlef states that managers have lost their
ability to keep up with technological advances, leading to the forfeiting of the new
knowledge that firms need to foster their long-term growth. These practices provide
justification for the commodification of labour.

A technique that provides commodification of labour is activity-based costing
(ABC). The original concern of the ABC technique was to increase the
competitiveness of manufacturing firms, by correcting the previous ‘misallocation’
of indirect costs (Armstrong, 2002). Armstrong contends that ABC provides a
platform for arguing that support personnel are an unnecessary indirect overhead, on
the basis that the volume of activity (cost drivers) should generate the cost of the
product or service.

Armstrong (2002) points out that the ABC’s stated claim that profitability can be
boosted through the dismantling of ‘support personnel’ is problematic and far from
5

convincing, as the correct allocation of indirect cost is unachievable. If the premise
that the definition of indirect costs can be traced directly to cost objects is just an
assumption, then it makes no sense to claim that ABC is more accurate than singlebased absorption costing. If the correct allocation of indirect costs (such as ‘support
personnel’) is unachievable, then, in principle, no standard can be set by which to
judge the correct allocation of those costs amongst products and services. Hence,
ABC’s stated claim of boosting profitability through correct allocation of indirect
overheads among products and services is questionable.

The question then arises as to what it is that firms intend to achieve by adopting
ABC, if ABC has not achieved its stated aim of boosting the profitability of firms by
accurately costing their products and services. It appears that firms are simply using
ABC as an attempt to control service personnel, seen as an indirect cost, by
designing a methodology to measure their activities. In this way, firms are able to
prove that these activities have no implications for profitability, or even that they
have a negative impact on profitability (Armstrong, 2002).

These techniques (e.g. ABC) and practices (IT outsourcing) provide justification for
the commodification

of labour, disregarding the consequences

of such

commodification on the community. It could be argued that the retrenchment of
workers shifts the problem from the firm to the community, which is compelled to
support them through the taxation system. Similarly, the restriction on employees’
ability to obtain increases in wages in turn puts pressure on the standard of living of
the community.

3.

INTELLECTUAL

CAPITAL

AND

INTELLECTUAL

CAPITAL

REPORTING
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Yakhlef’s critical analysis of the use of IT outsourcing practices to eliminate inhouse IT-related labour in firms and Armstrong’s critical analysis of the claim that
ABC increases the profitability of firms are relevant to our discussion of IC and
ICR. The commodification of labour with IC and ICR techniques is characterised
here in three ways: the absence of uniformity of definitions of IC; a trend to
privilege embedding of knowledge in systems and processes; and a trend that claims
using indices can accurately measure IC of firms. These are discussed below.

a) The absence of uniformity of definitions of IC
In the past, the term ‘capital’ was used to represent all tangible and intangible assets
and liabilities. However, the growing inability to offer a satisfactory explanation for
the difference between the accounting book value and sale value of firms led to the
creation of a subgroup of intangibles. This category required treatment in financial
reporting as voluntary disclosure, and eventually came to be known as IC.

Since the 1990s, the emerging global economy has led to an increased emphasis on
the importance of IC and on a firm’s ability to create economic value through
managing IC (Lev, 2001; Sveiby, 2001). Contemporary forces such as globalisation,
new technology and the demand for innovation, the relatively free flow of capital,
increased competition, changes in customer demand, changes in economic and
political structures, and the role of the state in supporting knowledge economies
have reshaped the way business is carried out (Buckley & Carter, 2000; Guthrie &
Petty, 2000; Thorne & Smith, 2000; Volberda, Baden-Fuller & van den Bosch,
2001).

In response to this special treatment given to IC reporting, a plethora of definitions
of IC have emerged (Yakhlef & Salzer-Morling, 2000), which differ significantly
7

from one another (Abeysekera, 2003a, 2003b; ASCPA & CMA, 1999, p. 4;
Brooking, 1997; CMA, 1998; Edvinsson & Malone, 1998; Edvinsson & Sullivan,
1996; Klein, 1998; Knight, 1999; Stewart, 1997; Ulrich, 1998).

For instance, Edvinsson and Sullivan (1996, p. 357) define IC as “knowledge that
can be converted into value”. The definition offered by Edvinsson and Sulivan
(1996, p. 357) recognises knowledge that can only create economic value.
According to this definition, labour can be classified into two classes: labour that
creates IC and labour that does not. Knight (1999, p. 23) defines IC as “the sum of a
company’s intangible assets”. That definition makes no reference to treatment of
labour as an asset or an expense in the composition of IC. Ulrich (1998, p. 17)
defines IC as equal to “competence X commitment”. This implies that labour that is
not or is less committed to the firm creates less IC.

The availability of several definitions and the consequent lack of a uniform
definition of IC and ICR (Abeysekera, 2006; Abeysekera & Guthrie, 2002) allow
firms to define these terms in an experimental fashion. Rather than helping solve a
set of problems relating to the measuring, managing and reporting of IC, the diverse
definitions can only give rise to the commodification of labour. As noted above, the
definition offered by Edvinsson and Sullivan (1996) justifies the retention and
fostering by firms of certain types of labour while dispensing with other types of
labour, citing their relevance to IC creation. Ulrich’s (1998) definition justifies the
retention and fostering by firms of labour considered as committed and competent
for the creation of IC while dispensing with other types of labour.

b) IC and ICR characterised by a trend to privilege embedding knowledge in
systems and processes
8

The authoritative definitions offered by CMA Canada and CPA Australia
(previously ASCPA) define IC as assisting a firm to codify the knowledge
embedded in labour in the processes and systems of the firm (ASCPA & CMA
1999, p. 53). The CMA Canada and CPA Australia definitions encourage the
perception of labour as a means of knowledge embedded in labour in processes and
systems. As Yakhlef (2002) has pointed out, in the outsourcing of IT services,
shifting the knowledge embedded in labour into processes and systems also gives
rise to new contradictions; firms become increasingly entangled in bureaucratic
processes dedicated to documenting matters, entrapped in assessing the financial
cost of these systems and processes, and assuming responsibility for the outcomes of
use of the knowledge embedded in systems and processes.

Labour is referred to it as part of capital – human capital in a firm in the intellectual
capital literature (Abeysekera, 2006; Abeysekera & Guthrie 2004, 2005; Edvinsson,
1997; Fitz-enz, 2000; Roos & Roos, 1997). Human capital refers to a combination of
factors possessed by individuals and by the collective workforce of a firm. It can
encompass knowledge, skills and technical ability; personal traits such as
intelligence, energy, attitude, reliability, commitment; ability to learn, including
aptitude, imagination and creativity; desire to share information, participate in a
team and focus on the goals of the organisation (Fitz-enz, 2000). Several authors in
the IC literature have cited human capital as important because it is a type of capital,
the value of which can be extracted to be embedded in systems and processes
(Backhuijs, Holterman, Oudman, Overgoor & Zijlstra, 1999; Edvinsson & Sullivan,
1996; Graham & Pizzo, 1998, p. 25).

IC frameworks for ICR identified in the literature identify IC comprising various
categories of assets (Brooking, 1996, pp. 13-15, 129; Dzinkowski, 2000; IFAC,
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1998, p. 7; SMAC, 1998, p. 14; Sveiby, 1997) or various categories of capital
(Abeysekera & Guthrie, 2004, 2005; Edvinsson & Malone, 1998; Meritum, 2004),
the latter being the more prevalent form of IC frameworks. This diversity of
reporting approaches means that each firm can set its own reporting agenda as a way
of addressing contradictions arising from the attempt to maximise market value.

Catasus (2004) considers that the labelling of IC categories as ‘capital’ in the various
frameworks promotes capital maximisation, providing clear evidence that IC
frameworks are primarily aimed at ensuring that capital providers maximise the
return of firms through the maximisation of their market value. Use of the term
‘capital’ implies that IC can and should be transformed into a stock of capital during
the production of goods and services. It also implies that the knowledge of staff is
treated as part of a firm’s capital, regardless of whether an employee stays with the
firm. As Mouritsen, Larsen and Hansen (2002) point out, the adoption of ICR has
encouraged managers to codify the knowledge of their staff as a way of exercising
greater control over events and transactions, regardless of the mobility of their
employees. This codification is achieved through the conversion of human capital
into structural capital, that is, the conversion of employees’ knowledge into systems,
databases, artificial intelligence, expert systems and other replicable programs.

c) IC and ICR characterised by a trend that using indices could accurately measure
IC of firms
More recently, ICR has entered into a stage of its development in which the process
of measuring and reporting IC has been reduced to a series of numerical calculations
in an attempt to provide more ‘tangible’ support for the narrative data. Support for
IC indices is partly driven by the empirical evidence that investors consider IC as an
economic asset, and reporting such information shows a strong association with
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subsequent share returns, with a simultaneous augmentation between the market
value and book value of firms (Amir, Lev & Sougiannis, 2003; Ballester, GarciaAyuso & Livnat, 2003).

Power (2001), reviewing IC statements as a technique of ICR, states that IC
presented as a loose integration of narratives, story lines, visualisation devices and
indicators is an ambitious attempt to support an economic logic aimed at maximising
capital production, rather than providing an accurate representation of activities
within a firm. Thus, in this phase of ICR, IC has taken on the form of a quantitative
symbolism through the use of measures such as indices. The literature has more
recently attempted to characterise this link as a way of explaining the logic of the
market value maximisation of firms.

In an attempt to make the link between numerical calculations and narratives, the
literature on ICR suggests five broad indicators for measuring and reporting IC at a
macro level, all of which are derived from traditional financial statements: the
market to net book value (Brennan, 2001; Daley, 2001; Dzinkowski, 2000; Knight,
1999; Sveiby, 1997); Tobin’s q ratio (Chung & Pruitt, 1994; Flamholtz & Main,
1999); calculated intangible value (CIV) (Dzinkowski, 2000; Stewart, 1997); Lev’s
knowledge capital valuation (Lev, 2001); and Strassmann’s knowledge capital
valuation (Strassmann, 1999).

The market to net book value (Brennan, 2001; Daley, 2001; Dzinkowski, 2000;
Knight, 1999; Sveiby, 1997) is the most popular and widely known indicator for
measuring and reporting IC (Knight, 1999). With this indicator, IC value is defined
as the difference between the market value and financial capital (net book value) of
a firm (Dzinkowski, 2000; Knight, 1999). Intangible value can vary widely from one
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industry sector to another. Industry sectors with a higher intangible value are
supposed to possess greater IC because there is a wider gap between their market
and net book value (Sveiby, 1997).

However, other theorists contest the accuracy of market to net book value as a
measurement of IC value. First, it is pointed out that investors have not perfected the
valuation of intangible assets in the market (Lev, Sarath & Sougiannis, 1999), with
the result that firms are often bought at prices far exceeding market capitalisation
(Guthrie & Petty, 2000). Second, the market value of a firm is influenced by the
economic, social and political environment of a country. For instance, the market
value of a firm in an emerging economy may be different from that of a similar firm
in a developed economy. Research demonstrates that among stock markets in
developed economies that have strong public investor property rights there is a
higher firm-specific market value (Morck, Yeung & Yu, 2000). Third, differences in
market value between firms are influenced by the psychology of the share market
and by a company’s economic potential outside and above its regular business
forecasts (Tissen, Andriessen & Deprez, 2000).

The explanation provided for the measurement of IC as the difference between the
market value and book value of a firm is also problematic. According to Mouritsen,
Bukh, Larsen and Johansen (2002), the value of IC increases with the increase in
difference between market value and book value of a firm. The authors argue that
this increase in value of IC is attributable to transforming or improving corporate
routines and practices. This explanation is problematic because the difference
between market value and book value of a firm can diminish due to a fall in market
value of a firm. The market value of a listed firm represented by share price could
diminish due to factors which are outside the control of the firm. If the argument of
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Mouritsen et al. is extended, the value of IC (created via transformation or
improvement of routines and practices) should diminish when the firm’s share
market value falls. It becomes obvious that the difference between the market value
and book value of a firm cannot be completely explained by the value of IC. Hence,
IC and ICR are cconstructions to justify value creation in the firm. The cconstruction
of ICR is clearly documented in the literature. Bukh, Nielson, Gormsen and
Mouritsen (2003) have found that firms fabricate their ICR to convince capital
market participants to invest in them. Further, Bukh et al. (2003) have found that
industry type, and the extent of managerial ownership prior to the initial public
offering, affect the extent and nature of ICR. For instance, they point out that
intangible-intensive firms need to report more IC information to lower their risk
premium perceived by investors, indicating that ICR does not represent the value of
IC. Rather, IC is reported to create a favourable perception among investors about
the firm.

Tobin’s q ratio is the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of its
assets (Chung & Pruitt, 1994; Flamholtz & Main, 1999). The strength of this
measure is that it addresses a significant weakness in the traditional accounting
framework, namely, the measuring of assets using historical costs (Chung, Wright &
Charoewong, 1998; Dzinkowski, 2000; Stewart, 1997, pp. 225-226). However, since
the assumptions underlying Tobin’s q indicator are anachronistic (as they relate to
the industrial era) and are more relevant to tangible than to intangible assets, its use
is likely to result in a false indication of the value of the IC of firms (Flamholtz &
Main 1999).

Dzinknowski (2000) and Stewart (1997) argue for the use of the calculated
intangible value (CIV) as a tool for comparing IC value between industries. The CIV
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calculates average pre-tax earnings and tangible assets over a three-year period, in
order to calculate a firm’s return on assets. The CIV can then be compared with the
industry average (Dzinkowski, 2000; Stewart, 1997). However, the difficulty in
accurately calculating a firm’s average return on assets, and the cost of capital (in
order to calculate the net present value of intangibles), limits the CIV’s predictive
accuracy (IFAC, 1998).

Lev’s (2001) valuation employs both past and future earnings projections. Lev
calculates knowledge capital (i.e. IC) as the difference between normalised earnings
and earnings from tangible and financial assets. The IC value is calculated by
dividing IC by the IC discount rate. Therefore, IC valuation can vary depending on
the discount rate chosen and on earning projections (Osterland, 2001). The absence
of a widely accepted rate of return on IC for a given industry sector diminishes the
accuracy of Lev’s calculation of IC value (Osterland, 2001).

Finally, Strassmann (1999) suggests that IC be calculated as ‘financial capital
rental’. In other words, the difference between economic profits and profits from
tangible assets provides the key to the difference between the market value and net
book value of a firm. Strassmann describes IC as the interest earned from the
accumulation of knowledge residing within the firm. However, since this method
measures IC as the difference between market and the net book value, it suffers from
the same weaknesses as those outlined earlier with regard to the market to net book
value method.

Each of these measurement models reporting IC is flawed at a basic level: they all
assume that IC can and should be measured, despite a range of problems associated
with the identification of IC value. The result is the creation of indices that can be
14

manipulated by firms for the purpose of presenting their economic wealth in a way
that maximises the firm’s market value.

A problem common to all ICR measurement models is that they entail the
assumption that indicators can accurately predict IC performance, an assumption
that is not supported by empirical evidence. Since none of the ICR measurement
models is proven to accurately predict IC performance, using these IC indicators
may not serve their stated purpose, and firms can choose the IC indicator that best
serves their goal of maximising their market value. Therefore, IC indicators are
problematic in the same way as activity-based costing (Armstrong, 2002), in that
their claim to increase the accuracy of IC measurement cannot be substantiated.

Instead, the main benefit of these indicators is their capacity to maximise the market
value of the firm in support of the objective of capital maximisation for capital
providers. This is a useful outcome for firms: the capitalist model of production
relies on investor capital to operationalise and expand capital growth in a firm, and
investor capital tends to move to firms that can maximise their market value so that
investors can gain the highest value from their investment.

4. THE INFLUENCE OF FINANCIAL REPORTING ON IC REPORTING
The extent to which future ICR will impact on the commodification of labour will
depend on the type or types of IC classification adopted by regulators, and on the
kinds of IC attributes that regulators are willing to incorporate into their framework.
If the framework is narrowly defined in a way that views managers as agents
appointed to manage firms on behalf of capital providers, ICR may communicate
only a limited aspect of the efficiency of a firm. However, ignoring the social and
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political stakeholders of a firm may sooner or later threaten the credibility of the
accounting profession itself.

The emphasis of ICR on the market value maximisation of firms can be explained
by agency theory. According to agency theory, human action is driven by owners of
capital who have delegated their rights to managers to maximise the wealth of firms
on their behalf. The term ‘agency’ refers to delegated decision-making rights. In the
case of firms, investors delegate their power – namely, decision-making rights over
resources and the right to control the labour associated with those resources – to the
management of firms (Armstrong 1991).

In its focus on the functional analysis of accounting monitoring and incentive
systems, agency theory perfectly describes the nature of ICR frameworks and
indices. Developments in ICR have created a generation of managers who regard
themselves as agents of capital providers and who, as a result, are motivated to
monitor and report IC on behalf of investors. In return, investors reward managers
through a system of monetary incentives for increasing the market value of the firm.
Decisions about who should be trusted, in these instance managers, and who should
not be trusted, in this instance support staff, are implied through the IC frameworks
and indices by their emphasis on the maximisation of market value.

Grojer (2001) states that the purpose of categorising accounting elements (i.e. assets,
liabilities, equity, revenue, and expenses) in financial statements is to create social
order, by controlling the interpretation of events and phenomena through their
recognition in financial statements. A parallel situation can be observed in relation to
IC. For instance, knowledge can be classified under the human capital category of
IC, or in one of the organisational capital categories such as processes and systems.
16

The choice of classification implies a particular interpretation of the meaning and
value of knowledge. The definitions of IC and accounting elements therefore
precede classification, since without defining their meaning it is difficult for IC
elements to be classified under IC categories. At the same time, the absence of a
uniform definition of IC means that IC classifications can be constructed. The result
is that financial reports can be constructed in such a way as to direct stakeholders to
view the world from the eyes of the reporting firm on the one hand, and of regulators
on the other.

The difficulty in quantitatively verifying IC processes for financial reporting
purposes has been acknowledged by the IAS 38 (IAS 38), which is the accounting
standard of intangible assets, as a reason for not classifying IC as assets in financial
reports. According to Catasus (2004), the IAS 38 revisited traditional accounting
classification-related concepts such as identifiability, control and future economic
benefit. However, the effect of the use of traditional accounting standards is to
produce a classification model whose financial statements provide limited
information about the affairs of firms. The prudent approach adopted by
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has increased the ‘unexplained’
gap between the fair price and the reported value (net book value) of the firm. An
asset meets the identifiability criterion when it meets one or the other of the
following two criteria: (i) it is separable; that is, it is capable of being separated or
divided from the entity and sold, transferred, licensed, rented or exchanged, either
individually or together with a related contract, asset or liability; (ii) it arises from
contractual or other legal rights, regardless of whether those rights are transferable
or separable from the entity or from other rights and obligations (Picker & Hicks,
2003). These changes to the IFRS to redefine recognition of intangibles have both
financial reporting and taxation implications (Koch, 2003). Since stakeholders are
17

not fully aware of the gap between the fair value and reported value of the firm (Lev,
Sarath & Sougiannis, 1999), this increase in the ‘unexplained gap’ may tend to
support the function of ICR as bridging the ‘unexplained gap’ so that stakeholders
can make more informed economic decisions.

Grojer (2001) also argues that the interpretation of phenomena and events ascribed
to accounting elements (in this instance, IC elements) is determined by the firm’s
choice of IC elements that are to be reported. In this sense, ICR results in a less
holistic presentation of IC, since the classifications included in ICR are based on one
or few select reporting attributes of IC. Naturally, the choice of attributes that are
reported has an impact on how stakeholders view a firm. For example, reporting
attributes such as cash flow and market value, whether in a regulated reporting
environment or an unregulated one that favours capital providers, could direct line
managers to institute management control measures to maximise cash flow and
market value, regardless of their effect on labour or on society at large. The effect is
that firms replace old practices that are based on social equity of labour with
practices that enable them to maximise market value.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The plethora of definitions of IC allows firms to define these concepts in a manner
that suits them and for the purpose of maximising their market value, regardless of
the consequences for the firm’s labour. Furthermore, the existence of numerous IC
indices whose relationships with market value have not been proven allows firms to
manipulate their figures by selectively using those IC indices that maximise the
market value of the firm.
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The result is the commodification of labour through IC-related practices and ICR
that are intended to win over capital providers, whose focus is the maximisation of
economic wealth. These techniques also provide line managers with a way of
justifying shifting aspects of human capital, such as know-how and expertise, into
structural capital, thus embedding this human capital into systems and processes
owned and controlled by the firm. The transfer of employees’ knowledge into
systems enables line managers to gain more control over ‘knowledge’ as a resource,
which would previously have been lost as a result of employees leaving the firm.
Overall, current ICR practice provides firms with a way of justifying to
stakeholders, such as the government and community, their view of labour as a
commodity and a liability rather than as an asset. This justification is further
supported by the classification of labour as an expense rather than an asset in current
accounting practice, as a result of which managers are driven to minimise the cost of
labour rather than viewing expenditure on labour as an investment. As Clegg and
Dunkerley (1980, p. 5) point out, capital is more than a mere collection of
transferable resources. Capital is an institutional system through which technology
and organisational structures are progressively developed, and the organisational
processes are differentiated and legitimated for rationalisation. Russell (2002) adds
that in a deregulated economic environment, productive capital is privately owned
by the investors and they hold the right to decide and discriminate on the preferred
type of labour required for capital reproduction in the firm. This means that the
recognition of IC in financial statements may not necessarily eliminate the
commodification of labour and may, in fact, encourage it.

Since at present financial accounting standards do not require IC items to be
reported, stakeholders can only rely on the voluntary reporting of IC by firms. As
demonstrated in this paper, the wide range of IC definitions, frameworks, and
19

indices allow firms to choose ICR which will justify maximising their market value,
resulting in the construction of data in ICR that hides the reality of the
commodification of labour. Hence, further research is encouraged in exploring
definitions, frameworks, and indices of IC and ICR that takes a broader view of
value creation rather than economic value creation only. Although there are multiple
definitions of IC exist, the definitions of ICR are limited. Exploring the extent of
intellectual capital in determining the gap between market value and book value of
firms can help in exploring the validity of the definition of intellectual capital as the
difference between market value and book value of firms.

20

REFERENCES

Abeysekera, I. (2003a), “Intellectual accounting scorecard – Measuring and
reporting intellectual capital”, The Journal of American Academy of Business, Vol 3
Nos 1&2, pp. 422-7.

Abeysekera, I. (2003b), “Accounting for intellectual assets and intellectual
liabilities”. Journal of Human Resource Costing & Accounting, Vol 7 No 3, pp. 714.

Abeysekera, I. (2006), “The project of intellectual capital disclosure: Researching
the research”, Journal of Intellectual Capital, Vol 7 No 1, pp. 61-77.

Abeysekera, I. & Guthrie, J. (2002), “An updated review of literature on intellectual
capital reporting”. 16th Australian & New Zealand Academy of Management
(ANZAM) conference, La Trobe University, Beachworth, December 4-7.

Abeysekera, I. & Guthrie, J. (2004), “How is intellectual capital being reported in a
developing nation?”, Research in Accounting in Emerging Economies, Supplement
2: Accounting and Accountability in emerging and transition economies, pp. 149-69.

Abeysekera, I. & Guthrie, J. (2005), “Annual reporting trends of intellectual capital
in Sri Lanka”, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol 16 No 3, pp. 151-63.

Amir, E., Lev, B. & Sougiannis, T. (2003), “Do financial analysts get intangibles?”
European Accounting Review, Vol 12 No. 4, pp. 635-59.
21

Armstrong, P. (1991), “Contradiction and social dynamics in the capitalist agency
relationship”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol 16 No 1, pp. 1-25.

Armstrong, P. (2002), “The cost of activity-based management”, Accounting,
Organizations and Society, Vol 27, pp. 99-120.

ASCPA and CMA (Australian Society of CPAs and the Society of Management
Accountants of Canada) (1999), Knowledge Management: Issues, Practice and
Innovation, Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants, Melbourne.

Backhuijs, J.B., Holterman, W.G.M., Oudman, R.S., Overgoor, R.P.M. & Zijlstra,
S.M. (1999), “Reporting on intangible assets”, OECD Symposium on Measuring
and Reporting of Intellectual Capital, Amsterdam, June 9-11.

Ballester, M., Garcia-Ayuso, M. & Livnat, J. (2003), “The economic value of the
R&D intangible asset”, European Accounting Review, Vol 12 No 4, pp. 605-33.

Brennan, N. (2001), “Reporting intellectual capital in annual reports: evidence from
Ireland”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol 14, No 4, pp. 42336.

Brooking, A. (1996), Intellectual Capital: Core Assets for the Third Millenium
Enterprise, International Thomson Business Press, London.

Brooking, A. (1997), “The management of intellectual capital”, Long Range
Planning, Vol 30 No 3, pp. 364-5.
22

Buckley, P.J. & Carter, M.J. (2000), “Knowledge management in global technology
markets applying theory to practice”, Long Range Planning, Vol 33 No 1, pp. 55-71.

Bukh, P.N., Nielson, C., Gormsen, P. & Mouritsen, J. (2003), “Disclosure of
information on intellectual capital in Danish IPO prospectuses”, August, Working
paper, Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus.

Catasus, B. (2004), “The labor of division – classifications in the making”, Working
paper, School of Business, Stockholm University.

Chung, K.H. & Pruitt, S.W. (1994), “A simple approximation of Tobin’s q”,
Financial Management, Vol 23 No 3, pp. 70-5.

Chung, K.H., Wright, P. & Charoenwong, C. (1998), “Investment opportunities and
market reaction to capital expenditure decisions”, Journal of Banking & Finance,
Vol 22 No 2, pp. 41-60.

Cleaver, H. (1979), Reading Capital Politically, University of Texas Press, Austin.

Clegg, S. & Dunkerley, D. (1980), Organization, Class and Control, Routledge,
London.

CMA (The Society of Management Accountants of Canada) (1998), “The
management of intellectual capital: The issues and the practice (Management
accounting issues paper 16, CMA, Hamilton, Ontario).

23

Daley, J. (2001), “The intangible economy and Australia”, Australian Journal of
Management, Vol 26, August, special issue, pp. 3-20.

Dekker, R. & de Hoog, R. (2000), “The monetary value of knowledge assets: A
micro approach”, Expert Systems with Applications, Vol 18 No 2, pp. 111-24.

Dzinkowski, R. (2000), “The measurement and management of intellectual capital:
An introduction”, Management Accounting (UK), Vol 78 No 2, pp. 32-6.

Edvinsson, L. (1997), “Developing intellectual capital at Skandia”, Long Range
Planning, Vol 30 No 3, pp. 366-73.

Edvinsson, L. & Malone, M.S. (1998), Intellectual Capital, Judy Piatkus Publishers,
London.

Edvinsson, L. & Sullivan, P. (1996), “Developing a model for managing intellectual
capital”, European Management Journal, Vol 14 No 4, pp. 356-64.

Fitz-enz, J. (2000), The ROI of Human Capital: Measuring the Economic Value of
Employee Performance, Amacom, New York.

Flamholtz, E.G. & Main, E.D. (1999), “Current issues, recent advancements, and
future directions in human resource accounting”, Journal of Human Resource
Costing and Accounting, Vol 4 No 1, pp. 11-20.

24

Graham, A.B. & Pizzo, V.G. (1998), “A question of balance: Case studies in
strategic knowledge management”, in D.A. Klein (Ed.), The Strategic Management
of Intellectual Capital, Butterworth-Heinemann, Woburn, MA, pp. 338-348.

Grojer, J-E. (2001), “Intangibles and accounting classifications: In search of a
classification strategy”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol 26 No 7-8, pp.
695-713.

Guthrie, J. & Petty, R. (2000), “Intellectual capital: Australian annual reporting
practices”, Journal of Intellectual Capital, Vol 1 No 3, pp. 241-51.

IFAC (International Federation of Accountants) (1998), The measurement and
management of intellectual capital: An introduction study 7, October, IFAC, New
York.

King, A.W. & Ranft, A.L. (2001). Capturing knowledge and knowing through
improvisation: What managers can learn from the thoracic surgery board
certification process, Journal of Management, Vol 27, pp. 255-77.

Klein, D.A. (1998), The Strategic Management of Intellectual Capital, ButterworthHeinemann, Woburn, MA.

Knight, D.J. (1999), “Performance measures for increasing intellectual capital”,
Planning Review, Vol 27 No 2, pp. 22-7.

Koch, D. (2003), “Lax standards leave investors vulnerable”, The Sun-Herald,
August 10, Sydney.
25

Lev, B., (2001), Intangibles: Management, Measurement, and Reporting, Brookings
Institution Press, Washington.

Lev, B., Sarath, B. & Sougiannis, T. (1999), “R&D reporting biases and their
consequences”, 2nd Intangible Conference in New York City: Intangibles
Management, Measurement and Organization, New York, May 27-28.

Meritum, (2004), “Intellectual capital reports – Managing and reporting on
intangibles”,

Online:

http://www.som.cranfield.ac.uk/som/cbp/meritum.htm,

Accessed 12 May 2004.

Morck, R., Yeung, B. & Yu, W. (2000), “The information content of stock markets:
Why do emerging markets have synchronous stock price movements?”, Journal of
Financial Economics, Vol 58, pp. 215-60.

Mouritsen, J., Bukh, P.N., Larsen, H.T. & Johansen, M.R. (2002), “Developing and
managing knowledge through intellectual capital statements”, Journal of Intellectual
Capital, Vol 3 No 1, pp. 10-29.

Mouritsen, J., Larsen, H.T. & Hansen, A. (2002), “Be critical! Critique and naiveteCalifornian and French connections in critical Scandinavian accounting research”,
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol 13, pp. 497-513.

Osterland, A. (2001), “Grey matters: CFO’s third annual knowledge capital
scorecard”,

CFO

Magazine,

April

(Online:

http://www.cfo.com/Article?article=2514. Accessed 9 November 2003.
26

Picker, R. & Hicks, K. (2003), “Derecognition looms for intangibles”, Australian
CPA, June, pp. 78-80.

Power, M. (2001), “Imagining, measuring and managing intangibles”, Accounting,
Organizations and Society, Vol 26, pp. 691-3.

Romer, P.M., (1998). “Two strategies for economic development: Using ideas and
producing ideas”, in D.A. Klein (Ed.), The Strategic Management of Intellectual
Capital, Butterworth-Heinemann, Woburn, MA, pp. xx-xx.

Roos, G. & Roos, J. (1997), “Measuring your company’s intellectual performance”,
Long Range Planning, Vol 30 No 3, pp. 413-26.

Russell, M. (2002), “What disability civil rights cannot do: Employment and
political economy”, Disability and Society, Vol 17 No 2, pp. 117-35.

Shaumai, W. (1997), College for Sale: A Critique of the Commodification, The
Falmer Press, London.

SMAC (Society of Management Accountants of Canada) (1998), The management
of intellectual capital: The issues and the practice, January, The Society of
Management Accountants of Canada, Ontario.

Stewart, T.A. (1997), Intellectual Capital: The New Wealth of Organizations,
Nicholas Brealey, London.

27

Strassmann, P.A. (1999), “Does knowledge capital explain market/book
valuations?” (Online: http://www.strassmann.com/pubs/km/1999-9.php. Accessed 9
November, 2003).

Sveiby, K.E. (1997), The New Organizational Wealth: Managing and Measuring
Knowledge Based Assets (5th ed.), Barrett-Koehler, San Francisco.

Sveiby, K.E. (2001), “A knowledge-based theory of the firm to guide in strategy
formulation”, Journal of Intellectual Capital, Vol 2 No 4, pp. 344-58.

Thorne, K. & Smith, M. (2000), “Competitive advantage in world class
organisations”, Management Accounting (UK), Vol 78 No 3, March, pp. 22-6.

Tissen, R., Andriessen, D. & Deprez, F.L. (2000), The Knowledge Dividend:
Creating

High-Performance

Companies

Through

Value-Based

Knowledge

Management, Pearson Education, Harlow, U.K.

Ulrich, D. (1998), “Intellectual capital = competence x commitment”, Sloan
Management Review, Vol 39 No 2, pp. 15-26.

Volberda, H.W., Baden-Fuller, C. & van den Bosch, A.J. (2001), “Mastering
strategic renewal, mobilising renewal journeys in multi-unit firms”, Long Range
Planning, Vol 34, pp. 159-78.

Yakhlef, A. (2002),“Towards a discursive approach to organisational knowledge
formation”, Scandinavian Journal of Management, Vol 18, pp. 319-39.

28

Yakhlef, A. & Salzer-Morling, M. (2000), “Intellectual capital: Managing by
numbers”, in C. Prichard, R. Hull, M. Chumer & H. Willmott (Eds), Managing
Knowledge: Critical Investigations of Work and Learning, Macmillan, London, pp.
122-40.

29

